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Abstract 
Drawing upon the agenda setting, priming and public diplomacy literature, this research 
examines whether the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal between Iran and the U.S. 
has impact on the public reception of tweets sent by American diplomatic actors in Israel. As 
the tone of the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal became more critical, we expected 
the tone of the public reception of American diplomatic actors in Israel to become more 
negative as well. However, we found no statistical evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, this study could be used for future research on digital diplomacy and public 
opinion on social media. We have solid theoretical grounds for suspecting that there is a 
correlation between the media coverage and the public reception on social media like Twitter, 
even though the results of our research suggests that it does not (Argyrous, 2011, p. 313). 
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Introduction 
As the Israeli media, as well as almost all other western media, were on top of the coverage of 
the Iranian nuclear deal of July 14
th
 of 2015, it is interesting to know how the Israeli public 
reacts to actors involved in making the deal. As this event is seen as a major geopolitical 
development in the Middle-East, in which the United States (U.S.) have played a key role in 
making the deal, “tensions between Washington and Israeli premier Netanyahu have raised 
due to the nuclear deal.” (Singh, 2015). As on political level tensions between Israel and the 
United States have risen due to the nuclear deal, it might also be interesting to know whether 
the Israeli’s public perception towards the U.S. diplomatic actors has shifted due to the 
nuclear deal with Iran. For example, did the Israeli public also became more critical about the 
American diplomatic actors that closed the deal, given the fact that this deal strengthens Iran’s 
position in the region? To answer this question, we’ll try in this thesis to connect the measures 
of the tone of the Israeli media coverage with the measures of the public reception of 
American diplomatic actors in Israel on Twitter. As we expect the Israeli news coverage to 
have a negative tone towards the Iranian nuclear deal and the diplomatic actors involved in it, 
we might also expect that this has influenced the Israeli public opinion, according to the 
agenda setting theory. This thesis builds upon the idea that the mass media influences the 
public opinion through agenda setting and priming (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11).  
As stated above, in this research we will use Twitter to measure the Israeli public reception of 
American diplomatic actors. “Social Networking Sites (SNS’s) like Twitter have shown an 
incredible rise in number of users in the last decade” (O'Connor, Balasubramanyan, Smith, 
2010, p. 122). “At present, everyday millions of people broadcast their thoughts and opinions 
on a great variety of topics on social media” (O'Connor et al., 2010, p. 122). Due to its 
incredible rise, SNS’s like Twitter are now widely being used by governments as a tool for 
public diplomacy. “Digital diplomacy is typically been understood as a useful form of public 
diplomacy” (Strauß, Kruikemeier, Van der Meulen & Van Noort, 2015, p.1). “It is often 
defined as the use of social media for diplomatic purposes” (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 4). At 
the same time, Twitter has “opened the door for two-way communication in public 
diplomacy, as Twitter allows direct interaction between an official account and its followers” 
(Strauß et al., 2015, p.1). Therefore, Twitter is very convenient to try to measure the public 
reception (O’Connor et al., 2010, p. 122). 
Now, because Twitter has opened the door for two-way communication, we might expect that 
we can measure the tone of this communication. We’ll try to connect this tone of the public 
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reception of American diplomatic actors on twitter, to the tone of the Israeli media coverage.  
The research question is therefore as followed formulated: Does the Israeli media coverage of 
the nuclear deal between Iran and the U.S. impact the public reception of tweets sent by 
American diplomatic actors in Israel? 
Subsuming, the use of Twitter to measure shifts in public opinion possibly offers an 
alternative way to measure public opinion. Mostly, public opinion is measured through the 
use of polls, surveys, or direct question interviews. “The measurement of public opinion 
through the use of social media might be faster and cheaper than the traditional measurement 
tools. For example, a standard telephone poll of one thousand respondents easily costs tens of 
thousands of dollars to run” (O'Connor et al., 2010, p. 122). 
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Case Background 
In 2002 it was revealed that Iran had started a nuclear program, and that it had two secret 
nuclear facilities (The Economist, 2015). “Since 2002 there had been numerous unsuccessful 
attempts to negotiate a deal with Iran to stop its nuclear program. The negotiations that led to 
the eventual Iranian nuclear deal of July 14
th
 2015 kicked off in March 2014” (The 
Economist, 2015). This deal was negotiated by members of the ‘P5+1’. These are the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., China, Russia, France and 
Britain), with Germany (The Economist, 2015). The main goal of the P5+1 was to prevent 
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon arsenal. However, Iran says “it has the right to produce 
nuclear energy, and Iran stresses that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only” (The 
Economist, 2015). Therefore, the deal finally made still allows Iran to “continue to enrich 
uranium, as the closure of the complete Iranian nuclear infrastructure was unrealistic” (The 
Economist, 2015). However, the P5+1 have sought “strict limits on Iran’s enrichment 
program and a highly-intrusive inspection regime to prevent cheating” (The Economist, 
2015). These measures will extent Iran’s ‘breakout capability’. This means that it would take 
a much longer time for Iran to create a nuclear bomb when it decides to cheat on the deal 
(BBC, 16 January 2015). It is estimated that this will take about a year, as it was only two-to-
three months before the nuclear deal was closed (BBC, 16 January 2015). 
For Iran, the deal means that sanctions that have had a crippling effect on its economy for 
years will be lifted. By lifting the sanctions, Iran is now open to international trade and 
investment, as well as it could return to the oil market. Iran will also have access to money 
that was frozen overseas due to the sanctions (BBC, 16 January 2016). 
However, this deal is expected to strengthens Iran's geopolitical position in its home region of 
the Middle-East (Naji, 2016). “Sunni-ruled Gulf states view the nuclear agreement and the 
lifting of sanctions on Iran as a threat and a sign that the United States are getting closer to 
Tehran at their expense” (Naji, 2016). “For example, they fear Iran could become more daring 
in its interventions in the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen” (Naji, 2016). 
Also Israel strongly criticize the nuclear deal. For example, Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu called “the deal ‘a stunning historic mistake’, stated that the P5+1 poorly ‘bet our 
collective future’, and added that ‘Iran continues to seek our destruction’” (Ravid, 2015). 
Israel fears that Iran is still able to get a nuclear weapon by cheating on the deal, as well as 
that the lifting of the sanctions will strengthen Iran’s position in its region. Therefore, the deal 
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also raised tensions between Israeli and the US diplomats, as the United States wanted to 
make the deal at high costs for Israel’s security, according to the Israeli’s. As Prime Minister 
Netanyahu states: “…it is clear that some are willing to make a deal at any price", referring to 
those American diplomats (Ravid, 2015). 
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Literature review 
Soft power and public diplomacy 
For states in international relations, having power is the ability to influence another actor to 
act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). Hard 
power in international relations is having the capacity to coerce another actor to do so 
(Wilson, 2008, p. 114). Examples of tools of hard power that states can use are military 
interventions, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions (Wilson, 2008, p. 114). Contrarily 
to hard power is soft power. “Soft power enables a change of behavior in others, without 
competition or conflict, by using persuasion and attraction, rather than coercion or payment” 
(Nye, 2008, p. 94). Soft power is a means of obtaining the outcomes an actor wants to obtain 
(Nye, 2008, p. 94). “The success of soft power of a state depends the attractiveness of its 
culture (for example the United States and the attractiveness of Hollywood), the appeal of its 
domestic political and social values (for example democracy), and the style and substance of 
its foreign policies” (Fan, 2008, p.4). An example of a tool of soft power is public diplomacy. 
According to Bull, diplomacy is seen as “the conduct of international relations between states 
and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and peaceful means” 
(Bolja & Holmes, 2015, p. 1).  Public diplomacy is defined as “a government’s strategic 
communication practice designed to project soft power, as it’s to bring about understanding 
for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
current policies” (Strauss et al., 2015, p. 370). Public diplomacy targets foreign non-state 
actors, in order to shift public opinion, create goodwill and “win hearts and minds” (Snow & 
Taylor, 2009, p. 10). We can identify three types of public diplomacy communication that a 
state could use in its try to project soft power on a foreign audience. The first type of public 
diplomacy we can identify is the ‘mundane communication’ (Nye, 2008, P. 102). This type is 
seen as the daily flow of communication from the government to the foreign non-state actors. 
The second type of public diplomacy communication is ‘strategic communication’, which 
develops “a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does” (Nye, 
2008, P. 102). The third communication type are ‘direct interactions’, which entails “lasting 
relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, 
seminars, conferences, and access to media channel” (Nye, 2008, p. 102).  
Digital diplomacy is seen as a form of public diplomacy (Strauß et al., 2015, p.1). Digital 
diplomacy is often defined as the use of social media (like Twitter) for diplomatic purposes 
(Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 4). This form of public diplomacy has opened the door for two 
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way communication (Strauss et al., 2015, p. 369). As Nye (2008, p. 103) notes, “effective 
public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking. We need to 
understand better what is going on in the minds of others and what values we share”. For 
example, Lee & Shin (2012, p. 515) have shown that “politicians that induced a stronger 
sense of direct conversation with its public are viewed more positively on Twitter opposed to 
low interactivity with their public”. Social media opens windows of opportunities for public 
diplomacy, because “it enables state actors to engage with the general public and specific 
audiences across national borders” (Strauß et al., 2015, p.369).  
Foreign publics now matter to states in ways that were unthinkable as little as twenty-five 
years ago (Melissen, 2005, p. 10). “The research on the new public diplomacy after 11 
September 2001 has become dominated by US public diplomacy, and it has been 
characterized by a strong emphasis on international security and the relationship between the 
West and the Islamic world” (Melissen, 2005, p. 10). However, “despite the growing interest 
in social media-based diplomacy and the increasing scholarly attention in the field, the study 
of social media in public diplomacy is still at its infancy” (Strauß et al., 2014, p. 369). Also, 
research has for example shown that occurrences of engagement between Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and their online public is still scarce and represents only a small part of the 
overall activity (Kampf et al., 2015, p. 350). “Results in previous research demonstrated a 
substantial gap between the digital diplomacy goals of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their 
actual dialogic engagement” (Kampf et al., 2015, p. 350). This also highlights infancy in the 
practice of digital diplomacy. 
 
Media influence on public opinion 
Mass media strongly influence public opinion as well. The agenda setting theory refers to the 
idea “that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain 
issues, and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). “This emphasis that the mass media place on certain  issues can be 
based on the relative placement or amount of coverage about the issue. Readers learn, for 
example, how much importance to attach to a certain issue from the amount of information in 
the news and its position” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 176).  
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The first level of agenda-setting, is the transmission of ‘object salience’ (Carroll & McCombs, 
2003, p. 37). This refers to the idea that the media determines the relative salience of issues on 
the agenda, by for example placing an issue on the front page (Carroll & McCombs, 2003, p. 
37). The second level of agenda setting states that the media also tells the public how to think 
about some issues, and is called the ‘transmission of attribute salience’ (McCombs, 1972, p. 
704). “Mass media can increase the salience of issues or the ease with which these 
considerations can be retrieved from memory if individuals have to make political judgements 
about political actors, and thereby the mass media influences the standards by which the 
audience evaluate political figures” (Scheufele, 2000, p. 309).  
Priming in the political communication literature refers to the idea that the media could 
change the standards that people have to make evaluations and judgements about political 
issues (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). “Priming occurs when news content suggests to 
news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for making judgements 
about the performance of leaders and governments” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). 
Priming is mostly understood as an extension of the agenda-setting theory (Scheufele & 
Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). It is therefore priming that is directly relevant for this study, as it 
refers to the ideal that media content has effect on people’s latter judgements related to the 
issue. (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2002, p. 97). Iyengar and Simon (1993, p. 381) for example 
have found evidence that “television coverage of the conflict in the Persian Gulf significantly 
affected American’s public concerns and the criteria with which they evaluated George 
Bush.” Another research on the media priming regarding political news coverage is done by 
Krosnick and Kinder (1990). “They measured the priming effect of Iran-Contra media 
coverage on public evaluations of President Reagan’s overall performance” (Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al., 2002, p. 100). This study, which did also include a control group, also found 
evidence that “media coverage of political events can prime people’s thoughts and 
judgements” (Roskos-Edwolson et al., 2002, p. 100). Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982) did 
research on priming as well, in two experiments. These two experiments also demonstrated 
that “media coverage serves as prime in influencing how the public formulates political 
opinions” (Roskos-Edwolson et al., 2002, p. 101). Clearly, as a number of studies have 
demonstrated, the media can act as a “prime that can influence later judgements and political 
evaluations” (Roskos-Edwolson et al., 2002, p. 102). 
It is therefore that we expect in this thesis that the Israeli public is probably affected by the 
Israeli media (through priming). This will mean that when the Israeli media coverage has a 
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more negative tone towards the Iranian nuclear deal and the diplomatic actors involved in it, 
we might also expect that this has influenced the Israeli public opinion in a negative way. This 
public opinion might possibly be measured through the use of social media, as “millions of 
people broadcast their opinions on daily basis through social media” (O'Connor et al., 2010, p. 
122). The social media accounts (in this case Twitter) of diplomatic actors involved in making 
the deal might be the best starting points to measure the public opinion on the Iranian nuclear 
deal, as digital diplomacy through these accounts opens the door for two way communication. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: As the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal became more critical, 
the public reception of American diplomatic actors in Israel is likely to be more 
negative. 
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Research design 
Case Selection 
As the hypothesis is stated as follows, ‘as the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal 
became more critical, the public reception of American diplomatic actors in Israel is likely to 
be more negative’, research is conducted on the tone of the Israeli media coverage of the 
nuclear deal, and on the public reception on twitter of American diplomatic actors. 
 
Twitter 
As discussed earlier, through agenda-setting and priming, we expect that the Israeli public 
reception of U.S. diplomatic actors has changed due to the nuclear deal between Iran and the 
U.S., and we expect that we can measure this shift in public opinion on Twitter. Twitter is a 
popular social network service in which users post messages that are short: less than 140 
characters per message. “It is convenient for research because there are a large number of 
messages, many of which are publicly available, and obtaining them from the web is 
technically simple” (O’Connor et al., 2010, p. 122). 
Twitter is also examined because of its “popularity among politicians, diplomatic actors and 
governmental representatives, its quality to facilitate direct two-way communication, and its 
accessibility to analyze online communication” (Strauß et al., 2015, p. 370). Twitter-accounts 
were investigated on relevancy, accessibility, amount of tweets sent, and language. The 
Twitter-account of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and the Twitter-account of Dan Shapiro, the 
U.S. ambassador in Israel, were chosen.  
 
Media 
To select the media from which the tone and amount of media coverage of the Iran nuclear 
deal is examined, several criteria were unfolded. First, due to a language barrier, the media 
had to be English-written instead of Hebrew. At the same time, the media should have a 
relatively large audience. In the case of Haaretz, the newspaper sold for example 72.000 
copies daily, and 100.000 at weekends (Haaretz, 2008). Also, the media coverage of a period 
between one month and one day before the deal and one month after the deal (13 June 2015 to 
14 August 2015) still had to be available for research. For example, on the site of the English-
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written newspaper Ynetnews, the data base for that period was not available for the public, 
and therefore this news site could not be used for this research. A longer timeframe did not 
add significant value to this study, as most of the articles on this topic where written in the 
chosen timeframe. A shorter timeframe was not chosen due to the fact we would have not 
enough data to analyze. The news site ‘Haaretz’ satisfies all criteria described above and was 
therefore selected. 
Data Collection  
Twitter data collection 
The tweets for this study were collected using the Google Chrome tool ‘Web Scraper’ 
(http://webscraper.io/). All tweets that were sent by the two selected Twitter accounts (the 
U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv’s Twitter account and the personal Twitter account of U.S. 
ambassador in Israel Dan Shapiro) in the period of one month before the deal to one month 
after de deal (14 June 2015 to 14 August 2015) were collected. After this, we had to collect all 
replies on these tweets. Due to this time frame of two months, the number of tweets was not 
equally distributed among the two accounts. The total sample consisted of 284 tweets that 
were collected. 125 of these tweets were collected from the Twitter account of Dan Shapiro, 
U.S. ambassador in Israel. 159 tweets were collected from the Twitter account of the U.S. 
Embassy in Tel Aviv. For the analysis of the public reception of the U.S. diplomatic actors on 
Twitter, the tone of the comments on all of the tweets between the period of 14
th
 June 2015 to 
14
th
 August 2015 of both Twitter accounts had to be measured. The total sample consisted of 
230 comments that were collected. 172 of these comments came from the Twitter account of 
U.S. ambassador Dan Shapiro. 58 of these collected comments came from the U.S. Embassy 
in Tel Aviv’s Twitter account. 
 
Media coverage data collection 
For the data collection on the media coverage of the Iranian nuclear deal, several steps were 
followed. First, on the news site of Haaretz, all articles on the Iranian nuclear deal had to be 
found and analyzed. At the ‘search-page’ of Haaretz, the following keywords were filled in: 
‘Iranian’, ‘nuclear’ and ‘deal’. Because our analysis was run with a lag time of one day, in 
which we correlated the tone of the comments on ‘day 2’ with the average media tone on ‘day 
1’, we needed to start collecting media articles one day before the one month period. From 
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date ‘12th June 2015, to date ’15th August 2015 had to be filled in the data tab. We used this 
lag time of one day for the reason that the media had to reach the public before the media 
could influence the public. For example, something that happened today, will be in the 
newspaper tomorrow. As Haaretz sells between 72.000 and 100.000 on daily base, the lag 
time of one day is something we should take into account during this research (Haaretz, 
2008). Ultimately, we collected 366 articles. However, 34 of these articles did not mention the 
Iranian nuclear deal in any way, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. Finally, the 
total number of analyzed articles about the Iranian nuclear deal is 334.  
 
Variables  
In this study, the tone of the media coverage of the Iranian deal had to be examined 
(independent variable), as well as the public reception of American diplomatic actors 
(dependent variable). Both types of variables are of ordinal scale, with the categories ‘positive 
tone’, ‘neutral tone’, and ‘negative tone’. The tone of the articles were measured on the level 
of the headline and the leading paragraph. An article of the media coverage of the Iranian deal 
was coded as positive when the article praised or supported the Iranian deal, or the diplomatic 
actors involved in making the deal. An example of this is the following article headline: “36 
retired U.S. generals and admirals announce support of Iran deal”. An article was coded as 
neutral when the article didn’t say anything explicitly positive or negative about the Iranian 
deal, or the diplomatic actors involved in making the deal. For example: “Tehran goes 
Hollywood: American culture seeps into Iran after deal”. An article was coded as having a 
negative tone when the article criticized or opposed the Iranian deal, the diplomatic actors that 
were involved in making the deal, or the Israeli-US/Iranian relationship. An example of an 
article with a negative tone is “Israeli officials: U.S. seeking to stifle discussion of dangers of 
Iran deal”. More information on how it is decided whether an observation falls within each 
category, and whether an observation is relevant for this study, please refer to the codebook 
used. 
The public reception of diplomatic actors (dependent variable) was measured through the 
comments made by the Twitter public on tweets of the American diplomatic actors. An 
comment was coded as ‘positive’ when the message praised or was satisfied with the policy of 
the diplomatic actor, the actor’s country, other diplomatic actors of his/her country, or policies 
the diplomatic actor supports. For example: “thanks to you and your husband for your service. 
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We are blessed to have unsung servants like you.” A tweet was coded as neutral when the 
message didn’t contained anything explicitly positive or negative. For example: “talked to 
Israeli Press aboard USS Porter, An Arleigh-Burke class destroyer. the ship is in Haifa Port”. 
A tweet was coded as negative when the message criticized or was dissatisfied with the policy 
of the diplomatic actor, the actor’s country, other diplomatic actors of his/her country, or 
policies the diplomatic actor supports. For example: “No one should pretend that this "deal" is 
in any way going to benefit Israel.” For more information about the coding rules that are used, 
please refer to the codebook used. 
Control variables 
To assess the possible impact of other variables on the dependent variable (tone of replies on 
Twitter), two control variables were used. “The control variables decomposes the data into 
subgroups based on the categories of the control variable. The effect of the control variables is 
to generate a separate crosstab for each of the subgroups defined by the control variables” 
(Argyrous, 2011, p. 158). The control variables we used in this thesis are (1) the language of 
the original tweet, and (2) the Twitter account from which the tweet came from originally. 
The language of the tweets either was Hebrew or English, and the Twitter account from which 
the tweets came either was from the ambassador Dan Shapiro, or from the U.S. embassy in 
Tel Aviv’s account. For more information about the control variables, please refer to the 
codebook. 
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Methodology 
Overview of media position vis-à-vis Iranian nuclear deal 
As our hypotheses runs as follows “As Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal became 
more critical, the public reception of American diplomatic actors in Israel is likely to be  more 
negative”, we’ll first give a quick overview of what the Israeli media position was vis-à-vis de 
Iranian nuclear deal, and the actors that closed the deal (mostly positive/ mostly negative). 
Here for, we’ll make two graphs. The first graph will show us how many articles were posted 
per day in the two-month period, and the second graph will show us whether the average tone 
of these articles was mostly positive or negative. Please refer to the chapter ‘Results’ for these 
graphs. 
Twitter tone analysis 
After this short overview of the Israeli media’s position, we will try to test our hypothesis. In 
order to measure whether the tone of the media coverage on the Iranian deal affects the tone 
of the Twitter comments on the Twitter-accounts of Dan Shapiro and the U.S. embassy in Tel 
Aviv, a linear regression analysis is conducted. First, the average tone per day of the articles 
on the Iranian nuclear deal was calculated. Second, because our analysis was run with a lag 
time of one day, the tone of the comments on day two (started at 14
th
 June 2015) and the 
average media tone on day one (started on 13
th
 June 2015) were combined. 
After this set-up, a linear regression analysis was done with as dependent variable the average 
tone of the Twitter comments, and as independent variables the average tone of the articles 
per day (block 1 of 2). In this model, two control variables were added (block 2 of 2). The 
first control variable is ‘language’. This refers to the language of the official tweet, which 
might be either Hebrew or English. The second control variable is ‘account. This variable 
refers to from which account the first tweet was sent. This might either be Dan Shapiro’s 
Twitter account, or the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv’s Twitter account. 
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Results 
Israeli media overview 
To give a quick overview of what the Israeli media position was vis-à-vis de Iranian nuclear 
deal and the actors that closed the deal (mostly positive/ mostly negative), two graphs were 
made. The first graph shows us how many articles were posted per day in the two-month 
period, and the second graph shows us whether the average tone of these articles was mostly 
positive or negative. Figure 1 shows the number of articles on the Iranian nuclear deal on the 
news site of Haaretz per day between 14
th
 June 2015 and 14
th
 August 2015. On the Y-axis 
(N), the number of articles per day are presented. On the X-axis (date), the date is presented. 
The average number of articles per day is 5.32 (horizontal line in the graph). The results in 
figure 1 show that a month before the deal there’s relatively little news about the Iranian 
nuclear deal, but over time more articles were published. The second figure (figure 2) show us 
the average tone of the articles over time. As we can see, most of the news coverages had a 
negative tone towards the nuclear deal (Tone mean below 0.00 is negative). However, as we 
can see, in the entire month before the deal was closed, none of the average article tones was 
positive, whereas the average article tone on certain days in the month after the deal was 
closed was positive. 
 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Twitter tone data results 
As discussed earlier, to examine whether the public reception of American diplomatic actors 
in Israel became more critical as the Israeli media coverage of the Iranian nuclear deal became 
more critical, a linear regression analysis was done in SPSS. 
The dependent variable is the tone of the comments on Twitter (ToneTwitter), and the 
independent variable is the tone of the media of the day before, as our model has a lag time of 
one day (ToneMediaDayBefore). The variables ‘language’ and ‘account’ were included as 
control variables. 
The model summary table is SPSS shows that the R Square without the control variables 
(model 1) is only 0,009. This means that the tone of the media accounted only for 0,9% of the 
variation in the tone of the comments on Twitter. However, when the other two control 
variables were included, (model 2), the value of the R Square increased to 0.059, or 5,9%. 
Therefore, if the tone of the media accounts for 0,9%, we can tell that the language of the 
tweet, and the account of the tweet account for an additional 5% (Field, 2009, p. 235). 
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In our model, the Unstandardized Coefficient B takes the value of -0,175.This B value 
measures the relationship between the tone of the media coverage and the tone of the 
comments on Twitter. A negative relationship between these two tells us that there is a 
negative relationship between the tone of the media coverage and the tone of the comments on 
Twitter (Field, 2009, p. 238). This means that if the tone of the media coverage increased, the 
tone of the comments on Twitter decreased. The value of -0,175 indicates that as the tone of 
the media coverages increased by one unit, the tone of the comments on Twitter decreased by 
0,175 units.  
The significance of this model however, is 0.294. This size of the p-value, which indicates the 
level of statistical significance, is larger than 0.05, and tells us that the effect of our 
independent variable on our dependent variable is not big enough to be anything other than a 
chance finding (Field, 2009, p. 53). 
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Discussion 
Based on the literature review of digital diplomacy and the agenda setting theory, we have 
tried to analyse whether the public reception of American diplomatic actors became more 
negative as the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal became more critical. In this 
section, our findings will be discussed. Secondly, the limitations of our research will be 
discussed. And last but not least, the most important implications of this research will be 
discussed as well. 
As the linear regression analysis has shown, the value of the R Square without the control 
variables is very small (0,009). This means that the tone of the media accounted only for 0,9% 
of the variation in the tone of the comments on Twitter. When the two control variables were 
included, the value of the R Square increased to 0.059, or 5,9%. Therefore it can be concluded 
that if the tone of the media accounted for 0,9% of the variation in the tone of the comments 
on Twitter, the language of the tweet, and the account of the tweet accounted for an additional 
5% of the variation (Field, 2009, p. 235). Unfortunately, this value of the R Squared is very 
little, which suggests that the model we have used doesn’t account for much of the variance in 
the tone of the comments on Twitter. 
The analysis also showed that the Unstandardized Coefficient B has the value of -0,175. This 
means that if the tone of the media coverage increased, the tone of the comments on Twitter 
decreased. This goes directly against our hypothesis that “As Israeli media coverage of the 
nuclear deal became more critical, the public reception of American diplomatic actors in 
Israel is likely to be  more negative”, because our findings suggest that the public reception 
become more positive as the Israeli media coverage becomes more negative.  
However, the p-value in our analysis is 0.294. This size of the p-value, which indicates the 
level of statistical significance, is larger than 0.05, and tells us that “the effect of our 
independent variable on our dependent variable is not big enough to be anything other than a 
chance finding” (Field, 2009, p. 53). So, because the p-value is larger than 0.05, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no effect from the tone of the media coverage on public 
reception. “We did not found sufficient evidence to think that the null hypothesis is wrong” 
(Argyrous, 2011, p. 313). 
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Nonetheless, this study has “its limitations, which could serve as stimuli for follow-up 
studies” (Strauß et al., 2015, p. 377). First, for this study only 230 comments were used that 
were placed on the Twitter account of Dan Shapiro, or the Twitter account of U.S. embassy in 
Tel Aviv. Over a two-month period, this might not be enough data to say something 
meaningful about the overall public reception on Twitter. This limitation is being supported 
by the p-value which is too large (p>0.05). Due to this relatively small N, the results can for 
example be affected by a few outliers. In other words, the small N of Twitter comments “lack 
statistical power” (Argyrous, 2011, p. 508). “We need a larger N to come to a conclusion that 
is not affected by a small N” (Argyrous, 2011, p. 508). 
 
Secondly, data that were used for this study were collected only over a two-month period. 
“This two-month period might have been sensitive to other external factors, which we were 
not aware of (for example, political events in Israel or the U.S., national holidays etc.)” 
(Strauß et al., 2015, p. 377). “Here for, I suggest a replication of this research, using a 
different timeframe” (Strauß et al., 2015, p. 377), and more Twitter accounts of U.S. 
diplomatic actors in Israel. For example, the tone of the replies on Twitter could be affected 
by events such as the 4
th
 of July (U.S. Independence Day). In the period before the 4
th
 of July, 
we can see a significant rise in positive replies on Twitter. We found 26 positive replies in the 
period between 1th and 3th of July, on a total of 79 positive replies on Twitter in the two-
month period. An example of a positive reaction in this period is “Happy 4th! Thank you for 
your support. Shabbat Shalom!”. This three-day period accounted for almost 33% of the 
positive replies on Twitter, and therefore, events like this probably has affected our research.  
In order to check whether we’re right about our suspicion about the influence of this three-day 
period, we have also ran a regression analysis without the data between the 1th and 3th of 
July. The exact same dependent and independent variables, control variables, and data were 
used, except for the data of the 1
th
, 2
nd
, and 3
th
 of July. In this case, we did found evidence that 
supports our hypothesis. The value of the Unstandardized B Coefficient was in this analysis 
0,024, which suggests that there’s a (weak) positive correlation between the tone of the media, 
and the tone of the replies on Twitter. This would also mean that if the tone of the media 
would become more critical, the tone on Twitter would also become more negative, which 
would support our hypothesis. However, we cannot just exclude data that doesn’t support our 
hypothesis. Also, the p-value of this regression analysis, which indicates the level of statistical 
significance, was also too large (p-value=0,919) and tells us that “the effect of our 
independent variable on our dependent variable is not big enough to be anything other than a 
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chance finding” (Field, 2009, p. 53). So because we cannot just exclude data from our 
research, and the p-value is too large, this analysis could not be used to support our 
hypothesis.  
 
A third limitation of this research is that we cannot exactly trace the origin of the Twitter-
accounts that have commented on the Tweets sent by American diplomatic actors in Israel. 
“Culture, media and political systems differ between countries, and this might influence 
whether and how people react on social media” (Strauß et al., 2015, p. 377).This research 
made the assumption that the public that replied on these Twitter-accounts was Israeli, but we 
cannot tell for sure, as the selected Twitter-accounts of the U.S. diplomatic actors are 
accessible all over the world.  
 
If we return to the research question (Does the Israeli media coverage of the nuclear deal 
between Iran and the U.S. impact the public reception of tweets sent by American diplomatic 
actors in Israel?), we can conclude that this study did not find sufficient evidence to support 
the thesis that the Israeli media coverage did impact the public reception of tweets sent by 
American diplomatic actors. However, we believe that if a follow-up research on this issue 
would take the limitations of our research into account, that there possibly might be found 
evidence that will support our hypothesis. 
Also, during this research, we did found a great number of people expressing their thoughts 
and opinions on the Iranian nuclear deal on Twitter. For example, we came across tweet 
replies like ‘This is a surrender agreement and a disaster for both Israel and the United 
States’ and ‘No one should pretend that this "deal" is in any way going to benefit Israel’. This 
strengthens for example the notion of O’Connor et al.(2010, p. 122) that “at present, everyday 
millions of people broadcast their thoughts and opinions on a great variety of topics on social 
media”. Therefore, we’re still convinced that it’s possible to measure shifts in public opinion 
through the use of social media networks like Twitter. “This could be useful because it could 
offer an alternative way to measure shifts in public opinion, and the measurement of public 
opinion through the use of social media might be faster and cheaper than the traditional 
measurement tools” (O'Connor et al., 2010, p. 122). “Now because we failed to find a 
significant result that supported our hypothesis, this research should not be seen as 
conclusive” (Argyrous, 2011, p. 313). There are solid theoretical grounds for suspecting that 
there is a correlation between the media coverage and the public reception on social media 
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like Twitter, “even though our research suggests that it does not. This can be the basis of 
future research ” (Argyrous, 2011, p. 313). 
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Appendix I 
 
Codebook Public Reception of American Diplomatic Actors on Twitter 
For the analysis of the data a codebook is used. This codebook code the variable ‘Tone’ for 
each reply on a ‘political’ tweet from the twitter account of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and 
the Twitter-account of Dan Shapiro. 
- The ‘Tone’ of the tweet can either be positive, negative, or neutral. This field 
regards the tone the tweet takes towards the political actor in question. 
o Positive tone: When the message ‘thank’ or ‘praise’ the diplomatic actors. 
When the message praises or is satisfied with the policy of the diplomatic 
actor, the actor’s country, other diplomatic actors of his/her country, or 
policies the diplomatic actor supports. For example “Obama is the greatest 
leader in the last 20-30 years”. Peaceful greetings like “Shabbat Shalom” 
are also coded as positive, as well as other positive personal tweets, for 
example “Dear. Our lucky that you're here at this crazy period!”, or “dear 
friend thank for this word's”. 
o Neutral tone: When the reply on the tweet doesn’t say anything explicitly 
positive or negative towards the diplomatic actor, on the policy of the 
diplomatic actor, towards the actor’s country, towards other diplomatic 
actors of his/her country, or on policies which are supported by the 
diplomatic actor. When the tweet is just information with no positive or 
negative tone, for example “talked to Israeli Press aboard USS Porter, An 
Arleigh-Burke class destroyer. the ship is in Haifa Port”. 
o Negative tone: When the message criticize the diplomatic actors. When the 
message criticize or is dissatisfied with the policy of the diplomatic actor, 
the actor’s country, other diplomatic actors of his/her country, or policies 
the diplomatic actor supports. For example “delusional president the worse 
ever for the U.S. & the world” (about President Obama). Negative 
comments on the diplomatic actors personal or non-politics related tweets, 
such as “oh the chief propagandist of obama in Israel”, or “You should 
change your name to "AmbShill" or "AmbButtSucker." 
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Codebook critical Israeli media coverage of the Iranian nuclear deal 
For the analysis of the media coverage data, a codebook is used. This codebook code the 
variable ‘tone’ for each article as a whole. Only articles about the Iranian nuclear deal are 
relevant, and only those will be taken into account. 
- The article could either be relevant for this research, or not.  
o Relevant articles: When the content of the article is (1) about or mention 
the Iranian nuclear deal, (2) is part of a string of articles addressing the 
Iranian deal and/or its implications for other countries, (3) refer to topics 
related to the political relation between Israel and Iran, or the US and 
Israel. 
o Not relevant articles: All articles that have no reference to the Iranian deal 
or the Israeli-Iranian relationship. 
- The ‘tone’ of the article can either be positive, negative, or neutral. This field 
regards the tone the article takes towards the Iranian nuclear deal, and towards the 
diplomatic actors involved in closing the deal or have influenced the outcome of 
the deal. 
o Positive tone: When the article praises or support the Iranian deal, the 
diplomatic actors involved in making the deal. When the article talks about 
specific actors that praise or support the Iranian deal or the diplomatic 
actors involved in making the deal. For example “36 retired U.S. generals 
and admirals announce support of Iran deal”. When the article argues the 
deal is good for Israel, or is in another way positive about the Iranian deal. 
Also, when the article emphasizes a good relation between the US – Israel. 
For example “Defense Minister Ya'alon praises Israel-U.S. ties in meeting 
with Pentagon chief Carter”.  
o Neutral tone: When the article doesn’t say anything explicitly positive or 
negative about the Iranian deal, or the diplomatic actors involved in making 
the deal. When the article doesn’t say anything explicitly positive or 
negative about the US-Israeli or Israeli-Iranian relationships. 
o Negative tone: When the article criticize or oppose the Iranian deal or the 
diplomatic actors that were involved in making the deal. For example “The 
Iran deal: From thriller to horror story”. Articles which talk about which 
actors strongly oppose the nuclear deal, or give negative publicity to an 
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actor involved in making the deal. For example “Polls show Israelis 
strongly oppose Iran nuclear deal”. Articles which emphasize the possible 
cheating of Iran on the nuclear deal. When the article emphasizes a bad 
relationship between Israel and Iran, or the US and Iran/Israel. For example 
“Iran vows to keep fighting the U.S. post-nuclear deal - and so does Israel” 
and “Iran rejects Germany's call to improve ties with Israel”. Articles 
which emphasize bad consequences of the nuclear deal, such as “The 
Iranian economy can expect to be bolstered by tens of billions of dollars, 
which will help terrorists and subversive groups, senior official says”. 
When the article criticize the way the negotiations have gone, for example 
when it talks about mistrust and espionage.   
 
Codebook Control Variables  
To assess the possible impact of other variables on the dependent variable (tone of replies on 
twitter), two control variables are used. The control variables we use in this thesis are (1) the 
language of the original tweet, and (2) the Twitter account from which the tweet came from 
originally. 
- The language of the original tweet could either be written in English or in Hebrew. 
Hebrew-written tweets are coded as ‘1’, and English-written tweets are coded as 
‘0’. 
- The Twitter account from which the first tweet came from originally could either 
be from the Dan Shapiro Twitter account, or the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv’s 
Twitter account. Tweets from the Dan Shapiro Twitter account were coded as ‘1’, 
and tweets from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv’s Twitter account were coded as 
‘0’. 
 
